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The capital as power framework, developed by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon
Bichler, argues that the aim of business is not ‘profit maximization’ but the dif-
ferential accumulation of social power. Using this framework as a theoretical
starting point, I analyze the differential accumulation strategies of Google and
Microsoft. I present qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrating that,
despite the fact that Google and Microsoft currently derive the majority of their
profits from separate businesses (and so by conventional logic are not in direct
competition with one another), the two firms are nonetheless engaged in an-
tagonistic competition over control of the computing industry.
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1 A hostile campaign
ON August 3, 2011, David Drummond wrote a blog post claiming thatMicrosoft was waging “a hostile, organized campaign” against Google’sAndroid operating system. At the time, Drummond was Google’s2 Se-
nior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer. The ‘hostile campaign’ he was
referring to was Microsoft’s recent purchase (made through consortiums that
included Apple) of a large number of patents from Novell Inc. and Nortel Net-
works Corporation. The goal of this purchase, Drummond argued, was to con-
trol two large blocks of patents around mobile technology (Drummond 2011).
Purchased for $4.5 billion, the Nortel block consisted of some 6000 patents
that, according to the Los Angeles Times, were considered “crucial to the fu-
ture of mobile computing” (Olivarez-Giles 2012). Later that year, Google
responded by buying Motorola Mobility for $12.9 billion (Page 2011). Yet
shortly after the deal, Google began selling off parts of the company. By 2014,
all that remained of Google-owned Motorola were its patents. According to
Google founder Larry Page, these patents would “create a level playing field”
and “protect the Android ecosystem” (Page 2014).
This patent war, I argue, provides evidence of antagonistic competition be-
tween Google and Microsoft. The goal of this paper is to explore and interpret
this competition using the framework of ‘capital as power’. By doing so, I hope
to add to a growing body of capital-as-power research looking at the accumu-
lation strategies of specific firms and industries.
The paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 reviews the capital-as-power framework developed by Jonathan
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler. I discuss their concept of ‘differential accu-
mulation’, and outline why the contrasting modes of ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’
are relevant to the analysis of Google and Microsoft.
• Section 3 explores the idea that Google and Microsoft are direct competi-
tors, despite the fact that they draw on different sources of revenue. I
argue that both companies pursue differential accumulation through the
strategy of ‘breadth’ (rather than ‘depth’).
2In 2015 Google reorganized its various businesses into a new conglomerate called ‘Alpha-
bet’. For simplicity, in this paper I use the name “Google” to refer to both Google and Alphabet.
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• Section 4 analyzes the convergence of Google and Microsoft’s differen-
tial profits. I find that after this convergence, the two firms’ differential
profitability became negatively correlated.
• Section 5 analyzes Google and Microsoft’s internal and external ‘breadth’
strategies, which I find to be tightly related.
• Section 6 concludes by discussing data limitations and by suggesting av-
enues for further inquiry.
2 Capital as power and the logic of differential accumulation
Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of ‘capital as power’ proposes that monetary earn-
ings are a symbolic representation of the power struggle between different
groups (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 218). Building on the work of economist
and social critic Thorstein Veblen, Nitzan and Bichler divide society into two
distinct yet interdependent spheres: ‘industry’ and ‘business’.
For Veblen, ‘industry’ consisted of the collectively held knowledge that under-
pinned society’s productive capacity. ‘Business’, on the other hand, was con-
cerned only with profit. ‘Business’ used private property to restrain industry —
an act of strategic exclusion that Veblen called ‘sabotage’ (Veblen 1908, 534-
536). Following Veblen, Nitzan and Bichler argue that profit results not from
the production of social goods, but from a firm’s ability to “strategically limit
social creativity and well-being” (2009, 261).
Having negated a connection between profit and productivity, Nitzan and Bich-
ler argue that profit should be interpreted ‘differentially’. What concerns cap-
italists, they propose, is the size of profit relative to other firms. This ‘differ-
ential’ profit, Nitzan and Bichler hypothesize, indicates firms’ relative power.
Capitalists’ goal is therefore not to maximize profits, but to beat the average
rate of return. To beat the average, firms seek ever-greater control over indus-
try, as “others must be prevented from accessing the same earnings” (2009,
246-247). In short, Nitzan and Bichler see capitalism as a process of ‘differen-
tial accumulation’.
Nitzan and Bichler argue that there are two distinct strategies for differential
accumulation, strategies which they call ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ (2009, 328). A
‘breadth’ strategy consists of expanding total profits at a rate faster than the
average. Breadth can be achieved internally, through ‘green-field investment’.
Or it can be achieved externally through ‘mergers and acquisitions’.
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It is the latter strategy, Nitzan and Bichler propose, that is the more reliable
route to differential accumulation. That is because green-field investment ex-
pands total production, effectively ‘lifting all boats’. In contrast, mergers and
acquisitions increase a firm’s sales without expanding total sales. Mergers and
acquisitions are therefore the more reliable strategy for differential accumula-
tion — they increase a firm’s share of profit (2009, 331).
In contrast to ‘breadth’, which focuses on total profit, the strategy of ‘depth’
consists of raising a firm’s profit margin faster than the average (or lowering it
more slowly). While accumulation through depth is effective in the short term,
Nitzan and Bichler argue that it is riskier in the long term. The problem is that
because depth entails conflict, it is likely to meet stronger resistance (2009,
332). As a result, firms avoid depth strategies when possible and instead focus
on breadth — mergers and acquisitions in particular.
Capital-as-power researchers have applied the idea of differential accumula-
tion to the analysis of specific industries (Hager 2012, Nitzan and Bichler
2002, Ch. 5) and more recently to the analysis of specific firms such as Wal-
mart (Baines 2014) and De Beers (Cochrane 2017). This paper applies the
concept of differential accumulation to two powerful firms in the computer
technology industry: Microsoft and Google.
Although the two companies began with different sources of revenue, I argue
that Google’s expansion has brought it into direct competition with Microsoft.
In 2017, Google’s Android overtook Windows as the most used operating sys-
tem (Lovejoy 2017). Google applications like Chrome, Docs, and Gmail pro-
vide similar services to Microsoft’s Office suite. Google Search competes with
Microsoft’s Bing. Both companies are pursuing markets in data analytics, AI,
and social media. Finally, Google and Microsoft are both rapidly expanding
their cloud computing businesses (Jones 2021). In short, the two companies
are competing for dominance in the tech industry.
3 The rise of Google: a new business, an old model
Compared to Microsoft, which rose to power in the 1980s, Google is a relatively
new player in the tech industry. Formed in 1998, Google became powerful in
the 2000s and today has revenue that rivals Microsoft.
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Figure 1: Google’s annual revenue, net income, and markup
Note: Annual markup is calculated as the ratio of net annual income to total annual
revenue.
Source: Financial statements are from Mergent Online.
On the surface, Google’s business model appears rather different from Mi-
crosoft’s model. Microsoft derives income by selling its software as a ‘product’.
Google, however, gives its software away ‘for free’. Google then derives in-
come by selling advertising space embedded within the software. Thus, from
the start, Google’s income growth depended on ever-expanding revenues from
advertising — a ‘breadth’ strategy.
Figure 1 shows three ways of looking at Google’s income growth. The grey line
plots the growth of Google’s total revenue. The black line plots the growth of
net income (profit). And the dashed line shows Google’s markup — the ratio
of net income to total revenue.
The evidence in Figure 1 illustrates Google’s pursuit of ‘breadth’. Google in-
creased its profit (net income) almost entirely by increasing total revenue.
Its markup (an indicator of ‘depth’) remained relatively constant, oscillating




Figure 2: Microsoft’s annual revenue, net income, and markup
Note: Annual markup is calculated as the ratio of net annual income to total annual
revenue.
Source: Financial statements are from Mergent Online.
Although Google’s business model differs from Microsoft’s, its accumulation
strategy appears to be similar — a fact illustrated by Figure 2. This figure
shows the same analysis as in Figure 1, but now shows revenue, net income,
and markup for Microsoft. As with Google, Microsoft’s profit growth depended
mostly on increasing revenue. Also like Google, Microsoft’s markup fluctuated,
but shows no clear trend.
Having established Google’s reliance on ‘breadth’, let us now look at its strategy
for increasing revenues. Google has always derived most of its income from
advertising, yet sought to diversify this income stream. In 2008 and 2009, for
instance, 97% of Google’s total revenue came from advertising. At the time,




We believe our revenue growth rate will generally decline as a re-
sult of a number of factors including increasing competition, the in-
evitable decline in growth rates as our revenues increase to higher
levels, and the increasing maturity of the online advertising mar-
ket.
(Alphabet 2009, 37)
To bolster its profit, Google looked to sources of income outside the advertising
business. However, these new activities failed to alter Google’s core revenue
model. By 2019, Google still received 83% of its revenue from advertising
(Alphabet 2019, 29).
One of Google’s new businesses was the ‘Android’ operating system. With An-
droid OS, Google tried to replicate the ‘ecosystem’ model developed by Mi-
crosoft (Bradley 2017). Some commentators call this strategy a ‘walled gar-
den’, but a better description would be a ‘monopoly’. By controlling the un-
derlying operating system, Google sought (like Microsoft before it) to control
the access point between software producers and software users. The goal of
this monopoly, Michael Lewis observes, is to create a ‘tollbooth’ through which
both consumers and producers must pay to access each other (1999, 71).
For now, though, this tollbooth remains largely indirect. Google has refrained
from selling software directly, and instead continues to earn income by selling
advertising space embedded in its software.
3.1 Why breadth?
Why have Microsoft and Google increased profits almost exclusively by increas-
ing sales? Why have they not tried to raise prices? There are several plausible
reasons for this reliance on ‘breadth’.
First, the software industry is a competitive place that is constantly expanding
in new directions. Although the ‘ecosystem’ approach attempts to enclose and
limit the free use of software, it is often unsuccessful. In general, software




The problem (for monopolists) is that any Stanford dropout with a computer
can create the next ‘game-changing’ piece of software. It is therefore difficult
for companies like Microsoft and Google to ‘safely’ raise prices. Doing so would
make them vulnerable to cheaper competition. For dominant companies with
massive fixed costs and a coterie of expectant stockholders, the safer bet is
instead to buy new companies as fast as possible. By doing so, big firms gain
new intellectual property, and with it, new revenue streams.
A second reason for the reluctance to raise prices may be the cost of incurring
antitrust backlash. A major benefit of Google’s ‘free service’ strategy is that it
protects the company from antitrust prosecution. The reason is that since the
1980s, US antitrust law has been restricted to proving that monopoly harms
‘consumers’. And consumer ‘harm’, in turn, is defined solely in terms of in-
creasing prices (Bork 1978). Although its revenue comes almost entirely from
advertisers, Google has successfully portrayed software users as its ‘consumers’.
And since Google’s software is free, it is difficult to show that these consumers
are harmed by Google’s monopoly.
This strategy reflects a broader trend in the tech industry, a trend prompted
largely by the high-profile antitrust case against Microsoft at the turn of the
millennium (Economides 2001). After this case, the tech industry shifted from
a focus on ‘production’ to a focus on the control of ‘access’.
Adopted by companies like Amazon, Uber and GrubHub, this strategy has a
two-pronged approach. On the one hand, companies maintain cheap prices for
end-use consumers, sometimes (as with Uber) to the point of direct subsidy.
On the other hand, companies raise prices for access to their consumers. It is a
model similar to the newspaper business of the 20th century. Software serves
as a platform for attracting users, and these users are then sold to the highest
bidder.
This two-sided model, adopted wholeheartedly by Google and increasingly by
Microsoft, may be why both companies have pursued a breadth strategy over
one of inflationary and disruptive depth.
4 Convergence means conflict
When Google began operations in the late 1990s, Microsoft was a tech titan.
But it would take only a decade for Google to catch up.
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Figure 3: Annual differential profit — Google vs. Microsoft
Note: Differential profit is the ratio of each firm’s annual net income to the average
net income of the largest 500 global companies (ranked by revenue) in the Compustat
database. Note that the y-axis uses a log scale
Source: Google and Microsoft income statements are from Mergent Online. Global
average net income data is from Compustat (through WRDS), series codes NI and
REVT.
Figure 3 plots Google’s rise, measured in terms of ‘differential profits’ (profits
relative to the average net income of the ‘Global 500’ — the 500 largest firms
in the world, ranked by revenue). In the early 2000s, Microsoft earned about
10 times more profit than the average Global 500 firm — a number that would
remain relatively constant for the next two decades. Google, by contrast, en-
tered the 21st century with about 100 times less profit than the average Global
500 firm. But by 2010, Google had closed the gap with Microsoft.
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As Google’s profits became comparable to Microsoft’s, the two companies be-
came engaged in mutually antagonistic competition. Both firms attempted
to gain breadth by “augmenting the relative size of [their] corporate organs”
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 334). Interestingly, it was around this time that the
profitability of the two companies changed ‘regimes’. Prior to 2010, Google’s
profits correlated positively with Microsoft’s. But afterwards, the correlation
turned negative.
Figure 4 shows this change in correlation. I plot here the growth rate of dif-
ferential profitability for both Microsoft and Google. Prior to 2010, Google’s
profitability moved together with Microsoft (correlation +0.69). From 2011
to 2019, however, the correlation turn negative (−0.23). This divergence in
profit growth rates occurred around the time that Google’s profits caught up to
Microsoft’s (Figure 3). After that point, neither firm was able to substantially
increase its differential profits.
I contend that these two trends are causally connected. That is, I propose
that Google’s convergence to Microsoft-levels of profit caused the divergence of
profit growth rates that followed. The idea is that once Google became as large
as Microsoft, the two firms competed for the same income stream. Thus, after
2010, Google’s profit growth came at the expense of Microsoft’s bottom line
(and vice versa). Both companies became monopolists, and therefore limited
each other’s expansion.
Today, it is increasingly difficult for either Google or Microsoft to ‘beat the aver-
age’, for the simple reason that these firms are so large that they effectively are
the average. Google is overwhelmingly dominant in the search engine market,
controlling over 90% of the world’s internet searches. As such, there is little
room for Google to expand. Microsoft is similarly dominant in business and
productivity software, leaving little room for growth. Because of this domi-
nance, both firms have no choice but seek growth outside their core business.
As they foray into mobile computing, cloud computing, and everything in be-
tween, Google and Microsoft now compete directly with one another.3
3It is also worth noting that Microsoft’s differential profitability stalled as early as 2000, sug-
gesting that its barrier to differential profit was unrelated to the rise of Google. The plausible
explanation is that Microsoft was a victim of its own success, its near total monopoly leaving
no room for expansion. Still, the question remains why Microsoft and Google converged on
the same ratio of differential profit — about 10 times that of the Global 500 average.
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Figure 4: Annual rate of change in differential profitability — Google vs.
Microsoft
Note: Differential profit is the ratio of each firm’s annual net income to the average
net income of the largest 500 global companies (ranked by revenue) in the Compustat
database. Note that the y-axis uses a log scale
Source: Google and Microsoft income statements are from Mergent Online. Global
average net income data is from Compustat (through WRDS), series codes NI and
REVT.
Figure 5 reinforces this antagonistic relationship. I plot here the results of
a two-step calculation. I first calculate the differential capitalization of both
Google and Microsoft — their market value relative to the average market
value of S&P 500 firms. Then I plot the rate of change of this differential
capitalization.
From 2005 to 2019, Google’s capitalization showed an antagonistic relation
with Microsoft: their capitalization growth rates moved in opposite directions
(correlation −0.46). This finding suggests that mutual conflict between the
two firms may be a significant factor in predicting their future performance.
81
SOFT-WARS
Figure 5: Annual rate of change in differential capitalization — Google vs.
Microsoft
Note: Differential capitalization is calculated as the ratio of each firm’s capitalization
to the capitalization of the average S&P 500 firm.
Source: Microsoft’s and Google’s capitalization is calculated using data from Global
Financial Data, tickers MSFT and GOOG L. S&P 500 capitalization is from Global Fi-
nancial Data, symbol SCSP500D.
5 Trading punches
Continuing the analysis of Microsoft and Google’s antagonistic relationship,
Figure 6 shows the markup of the two firms — their net income as a percentage
of sales. Over the last 20 years, Microsoft’s markup trended slightly downward,
while Google’s trended slightly upward. The two trends converged around
2018.
What might have caused the markup convergence? One possibility is that in a
bid to remain competitive with Google, Microsoft was forced to lower prices.
This hypothesis seems unlikely, however, as the two firms’ core products do
not compete directly with one another. Another possibility is that the markup
convergence resulted from convergent ‘costs’. I use scare quotes here because
I do not mean costs of production. I mean the ‘costs’ of remaining powerful.
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Figure 6: Annual markup — Google vs. Microsoft
Note: Annual markup is calculated as the ratio of annual net income to total annual
revenue. Trend lines indicate linear regressions.
Source: Income statements are from Mergent Online.
Recall (from Figures 1 and 2) that Google and Microsoft have historically in-
creased their profit by increasing their revenue — a strategy that Nitzan and
Bichler call ‘breadth’. This strategy comes with costs, namely the expenses
associated with green-field investment and/or the cost of merges and acquisi-
tions. For Google and Microsoft, it turns out that these costs of ‘breadth’ have
converged.
Figure 7 shows the converging costs of green-field investment, measured using
spending on ‘property and equipment’. Relative to Microsoft, Google started
the 21st century spending an order of magnitude less on green-field invest-
ment. But by 2010, this spending had converged. Today, Google spends slightly
more on green-field investment than Microsoft. Overall, the correlation be-
tween these two firms’ purchases is +0.96.
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Figure 7: Annual green-field investment — Google vs. Microsoft
Note: I use annual spending on purchases of property and equipment as a proxy for
green-field investment.
Source: Data are from annual cash-flow statements on Mergent Online.
In addition to matching green-field investment, it seems that Google and Mi-
crosoft are also locked in a struggle to match each other’s spending on mergers
and acquisition. Figure 8 shows each firm’s absolute change in annual spend-
ing on business acquisitions — change that is tightly correlated.
From the vantage point of ‘costs of production’, it is difficult to understand why
Google and Microsoft would want to match each other’s spending on acquisi-
tions. Such spending, however, makes sense when viewed through the lens
of power. Acquisitions, Nitzan and Bichler note, increase a firm’s share of the
profit without increasing the overall size of the market. Importantly, acqui-
sitions also remove one’s competitors from the market, bolstering differential
profitability. Viewed in this light, Figure 8 indicates that Google and Microsoft
are engaged in remarkably synchronous competitor removal.
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Figure 8: Annual absolute change in acquisitions — Google vs. Microsoft
Source: Acquisitions data are from annual cash-flow statements on Mergent Online.
This matched spending is all the more impressive, given the limited pool of tech
firms available for purchase. Yet despite this limitation, from 2004 to 2016,
Microsoft and Google coordinated their acquisitions spending with remarkable
accuracy (correlation +0.90). In the years that followed, however, Microsoft
went on an acquisition spending spree that was unmatched by Google. (Most
notably, Microsoft purchased LinkedIn.) I will discuss possible reasons for this
acquisition divergence in the conclusion.
5.1 A war for patents
Figure 8 quantifies the events that played out qualitatively during the Novell-
Nortel-Motorola patent war. According to Google’s Chief Legal Officer (David
Drummond), Microsoft’s purchase of mobile patents was a form of strategic
sabotage.4




By buying patents for mobile technology, Microsoft was encroaching on Google’s
turf. Importantly, it was an encroachment not on a territory of current prof-
itability, but on an area of perceived future profitability. In other words, Drum-
mond chastised Microsoft for attempting to cut off Google’s path to future dif-
ferential earnings.
Today, neither Microsoft nor Google derive their core profits directly from mo-
bile computing. Yet their actions show that this is an arena that both firms
are struggling to control (or at least struggling to keep the other firm from
controlling).
Interestingly, the patent war between Microsoft and Google came to a head in
2011 — around the same time that the two firms’ profits became antagonistic
(Figure 4). Thus this patent war may provide a case study in how differential
profitability can be zero sum, achieved not with but against other firms. It also
provides a fascinating case study of how acquisitions can be used as a form of
sabotage (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 231-233).
When Microsoft purchased the Nortel patents, it sought control over a set of in-
tellectual property rights. But its aim was likely not to use these property rights
for ‘production’. Instead, Microsoft probably intended to exercise its power to
exclude. By suing Android mobile producers for patent infringement, Microsoft
hoped to damage Google’s ecosystem, thereby choking Google’s profits.
In other words, the aim was not to increase Microsoft’s profit in absolute terms,
but to increase them differentially by sabotaging Google. Viewed through the
lens of profit maximization, this strategy makes little sense. But when viewed
through the lens of differential power, it is perfectly logical. Google’s loss is
Microsoft’s gain.
6 Conclusion
Mainstream economists typically assume that capitalism is positive sum, mean-
ing competition between firms results in expanded production. Nitzan and
Bichler, however, note that capitalist competition is sometimes zero sum. When




The patent war between Microsoft and Google may be such a case. Since 2010,
the expansion of Google’s profits came at the cost of Microsoft’s profits (and
vice versa). So it seems plausible that both firms are locked in a battle of
strategic sabotage. Both firms dominate their core areas of profitability, and
so are looking to expand to new territory. As they do, they encroach on each
other’s turf. In this respect, mobile computing may be just one aspect of the
Microsoft-Google turf struggle.
Having analyzed the competition between Microsoft and Google, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge the limitations of studying these two firms in isolation.
There are now other big players in the tech industry — notably Apple, Face-
book, and Amazon. In the future, similar methods could be used to study the
mutual conflict between these tech giants.
On that front, Microsoft may have recently repeated its acquisition strategy,
but this time against a different competitor. In June of 2016, Microsoft pur-
chased the social media company LinkedIn for $26 billion (Microsoft News
Center 2016). The purchase may have been a deliberate response to an en-
croaching competitor: Facebook. As Figure 9 illustrates, by 2016, Facebook’s
differential profit had converged with Microsoft’s. What we may be seeing,
then, is a deliberate strategy of ‘containment’. When another firm converges
on Microsoft’s level of profit, Microsoft seeks to ‘contain’ its rival by acquiring
the rival’s direct competitors.
My analysis raises many questions for future research. Why, for instance, have
Microsoft, Google, and Facebook plateaued at the same level of differential
profits? Is this a result of mutual competition? Is it a wider barrier to size in
the tech industry? Or is it simply a coincidence?
Another area for future research is to expand the analysis outside the United
States. Internationally, Google competes with Chinese tech companies like Ten-
cent and Baidu. Microsoft and Facebook also face a host of competitors. Be-
cause of the complexity of this competition, the analysis in this paper should
be considered exploratory.
Still, one way to interpret the results is that despite the complexity of inter-
national competition, Google and Microsoft have settled on a simple strat-
egy: match each other’s acquisitions. Although it remains unknown how
widespread this behavior is, it is my hope that this study contributes to our
understanding of the power trajectory of large corporations.
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Figure 9: Annual differential profit — Google, Microsoft, and Facebook
Note: Differential profit is the ratio of each firm’s annual net income to the average
net income of the largest 500 global companies (ranked by revenue) in the Compustat
database. Note that the y-axis uses a log scale
Source: Google, Microsoft, and Facebook income statements are from Mergent Online.
Global average net income data is from Compustat (through WRDS), series codes NI
and REVT.
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